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ESSAYS
COMBATANTS AND THE COMBAT ZONE
Mary Ellen O'Connell *
Shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush Ad-
ministration ("Administration") presented a definition of "enemy
combatant" created for purposes of waging a war against terror-
ism.1 The definition was only tangentially related to the definition
of combatant supported by international humanitarian law
("IHL").2 Nevertheless, the Administration asserted rights and
privileges imparted under IHL with respect to combatants-
namely, the right to detain without trial until the end of hostili-
ties and the right to kill without warning.3 The Administration
used its definition of combatant in November of 2002 to justify
the use of an unmanned drone to fire a missile at a passenger ve-
hicle traveling on a road in a remote part of Yemen.4 All six per-
sons in the vehicle were killed.5 The definition was also used to
justify capturing individuals in Bosnia, Malawi, and other places
* Robert and Marion Short Chair in Law, Notre Dame Law School. With thanks for
research assistance to Patti Ogden, Ania Kritvus, and Lenore VanDerZee.
1. See Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def., to
Members of the ASIL-CFR Roundtable (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.cfr.org/publication.
html?id=5312 (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Haynes]; see also Military Order of
Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. "International huma-
nitarian law" or "IHL" are the more common terms used for the law that applies to the
conduct of hostilities and occupation. See Jonathan Somer, Acts of Non-State Armed
Groups and the Law Governing Armed Conflict, ASIL Insight, Aug. 24, 2006, http://
www.asil.org/insights060824.cfm (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
3. See id. arts. 42, 111.
4. See Dana Priest, CIA Killed U.S. Citizen in Yemen Missile Strike: Action's Legali-
ty, Effectiveness Questioned, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2002, at Al.
5. Id.
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where no hostilities were being waged, and imprisoning them at
Guant,4namo Bay, Cuba, without trial.6 The Administration fur-
ther claimed the right to kill people in Germany and other peace-
ful places without warning. In fact, "Steven Bradbury, acting
head of the US Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, told
Senator Dianne Feinstein [in 20061 ... that the president may
have the executive power to order the killing of terrorist suspects
inside the US."7 The Administration based all of these claims and
actions on its own definition of combatant.
This short essay discusses that definition as it emerged follow-
ing September 11, 2001. The essay compares the Administration's
definition with the definition of combatant found in international
law. This essay will not discuss in any detail the additional-and
even more questionable-claim by the Administration that cer-
tain persons designated "enemy combatants" enjoy neither U.S.
nor international human rights or IHL rights or protections.8 Suf-
fice it to say that no human being can be denied his or her fun-
damental rights-there are no legal black holes.
The Administration's Combatant
The Administration's understanding of "combatant" must be
pieced together from documents, statements, litigation positions,
and the like. We know from these sources that for President
Bush, someone could be a combatant even in the absence of
armed conflict. This definition is not consistent with that found in
international law, which clearly requires the presence of armed
conflict for an individual to be categorized as a "combatant."9
"Armed conflict" is also defined in international law.' Both of
these definitions will be discussed following a review of the Ad-
ministration's definitions.
6. See Jason Burke, Terror Backlash: Global Web of Secret U.S. Prisons, OBSERVER
(U.K.), June 13, 2004, at 22; William Glaberson, Judge Opens First Habeas Corpus Hear-
ing on Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at Al.
7. Katerina Ossenova, DOJ Official: President May Have Power To Order Terror
Suspects Killed in US, JURIST, Feb. 5, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/02/
doj-official-president-may-have-power.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
8. Haynes, supra note 1.
9. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note
2.
10. Id. art. 2.
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Probably the Administration's first indication that it was creat-
ing its own definition of combatant, one not grounded in interna-
tional law, came with the President's Military Order of November
13, 2001, "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism" ("President's Military Or-
der")." The President's Military Order authorized the Secretary
of Defense to "take all necessary measures to ensure that any in-
dividual subject to [the] [Girder [was] detained," and defined such
individuals as any person who, at the relevant times, "(i) is or was
a member of the organization known as [al Qaida]; (ii) has en-
gaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of inter-
national terrorism ... on the United States, its citizens, national
security, foreign policy, or economy; or (iii) has knowingly har-
bored one or more individuals described. " 12 Sections 4(a) and
7(b)(1) provide for trials by military commissions of persons de-
tained under the President's Military Order.'3 The President's
Military Order did not say the individual had to be engaged in
the fighting in Afghanistan, or in fighting anywhere, to be sub-
jected to trial by military commission-it referred to anyone asso-
ciated with A1-Qaeda, wherever found.'4
A year after the President's Military Order was issued, the
Pentagon's top lawyer, William J. Haynes II, defined "enemy
combatant" as "an individual who, under the laws and customs of
war, may be detained for the duration of an armed conflict. In the
current conflict with al Qaida and the Taliban, the term includes
a member, agent, or associate of al Qaida or the Taliban.""5
11. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 1, at 918. The President relied on two
sources of authority for the Order: Congress's Joint Resolution for the Authorization for
Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), and Title 10 of the United
States Code, sections 821 and 836, 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, 836 (2006). Military Order of Nov. 13,
2001, supra note 1, at 918.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 919-20, 921.
14. See id. at 919. The President's Military Order provides that the Secretary of De-
fense will appoint the commissions. Id. at 920. Persons subject to the Commissions' juris-
diction have no right of access to any U.S. civilian court, foreign court, or international
tribunal. See id. at 921. While the President's Military Order indicates in its title and
substantive provisions that it applies to non-citizens of the United States, section 7(a)(3)
states that it shall not be construed to "limit the lawful authority of the Secretary of De-
fense, any military commander, or any other officer or agent of the United States or of any
State to detain or try any person who is not an individual subject to this order." Id. The
Pentagon developed regulations to implement the President's Military Order. See, e.g., 32
C.F.R. § 18 (2006) (establishing Military Commissions as required under the Order).
15. Haynes, supra note 1.
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Haynes did not base this "combatant by association" test on any
international law authority. Rather, he relied on a 1942 Supreme
Court decision, Ex parte Quirin, to justify declaring individuals
enemy combatants and detaining them until the end of hostilities
in the "novel" conflict with Al-Qaeda. 16 However, the only issue
before the Quirin Court was whether the President had the au-
thority to try the defendants before a military tribunal rather
than in a civilian court. 7 The Court was not asked "Who is a
combatant?" The answer to that question lies not in Quirin but
rather in international law-international law that did not even
exist at the time of Quirin.
In 2003, several months after the Haynes memorandum, and
following the President's Military Order, President Bush declared
Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri an enemy combatant.'" Al-Marri, a Qa-
tari citizen, was studying in Peoria, Illinois on September 11,
2001."9 After the attacks, he was placed in civilian custody as a
material witness.2' Between 2002 and 2003, he was charged with
lying to the FBI and with credit card fraud.21 President Bush de-
clared al-Marri an enemy combatant on June 23, 2003, and he
was moved from a prison in Illinois to a military brig in South
Carolina.22 In late 2008, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
al-Marri's case to hear and decide his claim that he did not act as
a "combatant."23 On January 23, 2009, President Obama signed
executive orders with respect to major aspects of the "global war
on terror.,24 Mr. al-Marri's case, however, remained pending be-
fore the Supreme Court at the time of this writing.
In 2002, prior to the Haynes memorandum but after the Presi-
dent's Military Order, President Bush declared Jos6 Padilla an
16. See id. (citing Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942)).
17. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18-19.
18. A redacted version of the President's order is available at http://fll.findlaw.com/
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/almarri/almarri62303exord.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
19. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert.
granted, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008).
20. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 219.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008).
24. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009); Exec. Order No.
13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009); Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan.
22, 2009).
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enemy combatant.25 Jos6 Padilla was arrested in Chicago on May
8, 2002.26 He too was originally arrested by civilian authorities
and charged with various terrorism crimes, and was moved from
a civilian to a military prison when President Bush declared him
an enemy combatant.27 In a redacted statement declaring Padilla
an enemy combatant, the President said Padilla qualified for
combatant status for his "conduct in preparation for acts of inter-
national terrorism."2" In 2005, however, the Administration re-
quested that Padilla be moved back to the criminal system; the
Supreme Court granted the request while it reviewed Padilla's
petition for certiorari.29
On November 3, 2002, agents of the CIA, using an unmanned
Predator drone, fired a Hellfire missile at a vehicle in remote Ye-
men, killing six men.3" One of those men was a suspected high-
ranking Al-Qaeda lieutenant.3 According to the media, Yemen
had knowledge of the operation.32 Following the strike, then-
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice stated, "[W]e're in a
new kind of war, and we've made very clear that it is important
that this new kind of war be fought on different battlefields."33
The Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs at the De-
partment of Defense, Charles Allen, made it even clearer how the
Administration viewed the Yemen killings. He said the United
States could target "al-Qaeda and other international terrorists
around the world, and those who support such terrorists."34 He
25. A redacted version of the President's order is available at http://fll.findlaw.com
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/padillabush60902det.pdf (last visited Feb. 26,
2009) [hereinafter Presidential Determination on Jos6 Padilla].
26. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In Padilla v. Rumsfeld,
the Court of Appeals, by a vote of two-to-one, found the President had insufficient authori-
ty from Congress to declare Padilla an enemy combatant under the circumstances. 352
F.3d 695, 712-18 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd on other grounds by Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S.
426 (2004).
27. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
28. Presidential Determination on Jos6 Padilla, supra note 25.
29. Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084, 1084-85 (2006) (order granting Government's
transfer request). The Court subsequently denied Padilla's petition for certiorari. Padilla
v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006).
30. Jack Kelly, U.S. Kills Al-Qaeda Suspects in Yemen, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 2002, at
Al.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Fox News Sunday: Interview with Condoleezza Rice (Fox television broadcast Nov.
10, 2002).
34. Anthony Dworkin, Law and the Campaign Against Terrorism: The View from the
Pentagon, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Dec. 16, 2002, http://www.crimesofwar.org/print/on
20091
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stated that suspects could be targeted and killed on the streets of
a European city such as Hamburg.35 And, as noted at the outset of
this essay, a top Justice Department lawyer said the President
had the authority to order suspects killed in the United States.36
The Administration apparently developed this position regarding
the right to kill mere suspects based on the IHL principle of com-
batant immunity.37
Further confirmation that the Administration labeled individ-
uals combatants on the basis of association alone came during an
oral argument in a federal court challenge by detainees held at
Guantinamo Bay. According to the New York Times,
The judge, Joyce Hens Green of the Federal District Court in Wash-
ington, asked a series of hypothetical questions about who might be
detained as an enemy combatant under the government's definition.
What about "a little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to
what she thinks is a charitable organization that helps orphans in
Afghanistan but really is a front to finance Al Qaeda activities?" she
asked. And what about a resident of Dublin "who teaches English to
the son of a person the C.I.A. knows to be a member of Al Qaeda?"
And "what about a Wall Street Journal reporter, working in Afgha-
nistan, who knows the exact location of Osama bin Laden but does
not reveal it to the United States government in order to protect her
source?" [Department of Justice attorney] Boyle said the military
had the power to detain all three people as enemy combatants.
38
Boyle spoke only of detaining these individuals. Yet, the Adminis-
tration's position also encompassed killing combatants without
warning-not just indefinite detention.39
International Law's Combatant
As the example of the elderly Swiss lady indicates, the Admin-
istration's definition of "combatant" was apparently designed to
achieve certain outcomes. It is only tangentially related to the de-
news/pentagon-print.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
35. Id.
36. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
37. See Dworkin, supra note 34; see also Mary Ellen O'Connell, New ILA Study Com-
mittee To Report on the Meaning of War, ABILA NEWSLETTER, Jan. 2006, at 2-3.
38. Adam Liptak, In Terror Cases, Administration Sets Own Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
27, 2005, at Al.
39. Kenneth Roth, Drawing the Line: War Rules and Law Enforcement Rules in the
Fight against Terrorism, in HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004: HuMAN RIGHTS
AND ARMED CONFLICT 177 177-78 (2004).
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finition of combatant under international law. Under interna-
tional law, a combatant is either a member of a state's armed
forces during armed conflict or a person who takes direct part in
armed conflict hostilities. These definitions are supported by a
number of legal authorities, including, perhaps most importantly,
Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Convention.4 °
Under Additional Protocol I,
Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than med-
ical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Con-
vention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to partic-
ipate directly in hostilities....
Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.
4 1
Persons with a right to take direct part in hostilities are lawful
combatants; those without such a right are unlawful comba-
tants.42
Some prefer to continue to reserve the term "combatant" for
members of a state's armed forces in an international armed con-
flict.43 They use the term "unprivileged belligerent" for someone
with no right to engage in an international armed conflict. 44 This
40. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Geneva Protocol I]; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional
Geneva Protocol II]; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 27 (2004); Michael N. Schmitt, "Direct Participation in
Hostilities" and 21st Century Armed Conflict, in KRISENSICHERUNG UND HUMANITARER
SCHUTZ-CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION 505 (Horst Fischer et al.
eds., 2004).
41. Additional Geneva Protocol I, supra note 40, arts. 43, 51.
42. See Knut Dorman, The Legal Situation of "Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants",
85 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 45, 46 (2003) ("[Ulnlawful/unprivileged combatant/belligerent is
understood as describing all persons taking a direct part in hostilities without being en-
titled to do so and who therefore cannot be classified as prisoners of war on falling into the
power of the enemy.").
43. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to al Qaeda, 56 CATH. U. L. REV.
759, 767 (2007).
44. Frits Kalshoven remarks, "The 'unprivileged belligerent' goes back to [Richard]
Baxter's famous article; he was an army major (and a lawyer) at the time and his termi-
nology came from the Hague Regulations. In the seventies, he [ I] was not using this termi-
nology any longer, so we may all forget it. The choice is reduced to 'combatant' or 'civi-
lian'!" E-mail from Frits Kalshoven, Professor Emeritus of Law, Leiden University, to
Mary Ellen O'Connell, Robert and Marion Short Chair in Law, Notre Dame Law School
(Feb. 26, 2009, 11:47 EST) (on file with author); see D6rmann, supra note 42, at 46-47. See
generally Richard R. Baxter, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerillas, and
20091
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term may also be used respecting rebels in an internal or non-
international armed conflict.45 "Unprivileged belligerent" is, how-
ever, increasingly being abandoned.46 The term "combatant" in
English means someone who takes part in combat.4 ' That mean-
ing tracks the more up-to-date use adopted here. Attempts to
substitute other straightforward terms, such as "fighter" have not
succeeded, in part because other languages do not reflect a dis-
tinction between "fighters" and "combatants. 48 The International
Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") defines "enemy combatant"
as "a person who, either lawfully or unlawfully, engages in hostil-
ities for the opposing side in an international armed conflict."49
However, a comprehensive study of customary international law
undertaken under the ICRC's auspices indicates,
Persons taking a direct part in hostilities in non-international armed
conflicts are sometimes labeled "combatants." For example, in a reso-
lution on respect for human rights in armed conflict adopted in 1970,
the UN General Assembly speaks of "combatants in all armed con-
flicts." More recently, the term "combatant" was used in the Cairo
Declaration and Cairo Plan of Action for both types of conflicts.
However, this designation is only used in its generic meaning and
indicates that these persons do not enjoy the protection against at-
tack accorded to civilians, but does not imply a right to combatant
status or prisoner-of-war status, as applicable in international
armed conflicts.
50
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323 (1951). Kalshoven adds:
Baxter's use of the phrase "unprivileged belligerents" went back to the Hague
Regulations, where both the parties at war and the persons fighting it are re-
ferred to as belligerents. Since the making of [the] 1977 Protocol I the term
has replaced the "belligerent", and taking part in hostilities is no longer re-
garded as a privilege but is recognised as an entitlement, or right.
E-mail from Frits Kalshoven, Professor Emeritus of Law, Leiden University, to Mary El-
len O'Connell, Robert and Marion Short Chair in Law, Notre Dame Law School, (Jan. 30,
2009, 11:58 EST) (on file with author).
45. See Baxter, supra note 43, at 333-34.
46. CrimA 6659/06, 1757/07, 8228/07, 3261108 A, B v. Israel [2008] at 9-13 (S. Ct.
Israel), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/06/590/066/nO4/06066590.nO4.pdf
(accepting an Israeli law on detention that defined "unlawful combatant" as someone in-
volved only indirectly in hostilities). See id.
47. See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 261 (2d ed. 1997).
48. See I CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 13 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts
& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
49. Official Statement, International Committee of the Red Cross, The Relevance of
IHL in the Context of Terrorism (July 21, 2005), http://www.icrc.org/Web/EngsiteengO.
nsf/html/terrorism-ihl-210705 (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) [hereinafter ICRC Statement].
50. I CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 48, at 12 (footnotes
omitted).
[Vol. 43:845
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It is imperative to have a clear, straightforward distinction be-
tween those who may be a target and those who may not. The
preferred terms today are "combatant" and "civilian." Whether a
combatant can later be tried for unlawfully participating in an
armed conflict is not of such urgent importance as the need for
clarity on the battlefield as to who may be killed. Combatants
may be; civilians may not. The use of clear terms is critical in
training soldiers. For purposes of prosecution or determining
prisoner-of-war status, the term "unlawful" can be added." Nor
does there appear to be any reason to restrict the term "comba-
tant" to international armed conflicts, as the "direct participa-
tion" definition appears in Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions relative to non-international armed conflict. 2 Other
terms are used, such as "rebel," to denote anyone rebelling
against a government, and "insurgent," to denote a member of a
group that does not control territory and is, therefore, unlikely to
be participating in an armed conflict, which generally requires all
sides to control some territory.53
One aspect of the definition of combatant that remains dis-
puted is whether those who are no longer directly engaged in hos-
tilities in the context of an armed conflict are, in fact, still comba-
tants, or whether they become civilians upon their cessation of
active involvement. The ICRC provides that "[p]eople who do not
or can no longer take part in the hostilities are entitled to respect
for their lives and for their physical and mental integrity. Such
people must in all circumstances be protected and treated with
humanity, without any unfavorable distinction whatever."4
Regardless, no one is a combatant in the absence of armed con-
flict. According to the ICRC, "From an IHL perspective, the term
'combatant' or 'enemy combatant' has no legal meaning outside of
armed conflict."55 To know who is a combatant, therefore, requires
knowing the meaning of armed conflict. Like the definition of
combatant, the meaning of "armed conflict" must be found in in-
ternational law; it cannot be constructed to suit a particular pur-
51. See ICRC Statement, supra note 49.
52. Additional Geneva Protocol II, supra note 40, art. 13(3).
53. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
54. International Committee of the Red Cross, What are the Essential Rules of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law? (Oct. 31, 2002), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/
html]5KZFJU (last visited Feb. 26, 2009) (emphasis added).
55. ICRC Statement, supra note 49.
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pose. Armed conflict is determined today by facts of fighting, not
mere declarations as in the period before the adoption of the
United Nations Charter.5" The International Law Association
("ILA") tasked its Committee on the Use of Force in 2005 to re-
port on the definition of "armed conflict" in international law. 7
The Committee gave its Initial Report in 2008 and identified the
following two core characteristics of any armed conflict:
Looking to relevant treaties-in particular IHL treaties-rules of
customary international law, general principles of international law,
judicial decisions and the writing of scholars, as of the drafting of
this Initial Report, the Committee has found evidence of at least two
characteristics with respect to all armed conflict:
1.) The existence of organized armed groups
2.) Engaged in fighting of some intensity
These characteristics were restated perhaps most authoritatively in
a 1995 decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Tadic. That decision has been widely
cited for its description of the characteristics of armed conflict.
58
According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia in Tadic, an armed conflict exists "whenever
there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups within a State." 9 The Tad-
ic decisions do not mention whether fighting must be significant
or intense, but the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Con-
ventions incorporate both concepts of intensity and organized
fighting for a situation to be an "armed conflict."6" Additional Pro-
tocol II applies only to conflicts that are more than "situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
56. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, What is War?, JURIST, Mar. 17, 2004, http://jurist.law.
pitt.edu/forum/oconnelll.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2009); Gary D. Solis, Are We Really at
War?, 127 U.S. NAvAL INST. PROC. 34 (2001).
57. INT'L LAw ASS'N, COMM. ON THE USE OF FORCE, INITIAL REPORT ON THE MEANING
OF ARMED CONFLICT IN INT'L LAw 1-2 (2008), http://www.ila-hq.orgdownload.cfm/docid/
0C19D883-3312-4731-92C4A18A55147597 [hereinafter ILA USE OF FORCE COMM.
REPORT].
58. Id.
59. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction 70 (Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.icty.orgx/Cas
es/tadic/tdeden100895.htm.
60. Additional Geneva Protocol II, supra note 40, art. 1.
[Vol. 43:845
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sporadic acts of violence."61 The cases surveyed by the ILA Use of
Force Committee plainly support the element of "intensity."62
The International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case also
distinguished minor armed exchanges from attacks that give rise
to the right of self-defense as too insignificant to be labeled
"armed conflict,"63 as did the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission
in 2005.64 Incidents that do not trigger the right of self-defense
are too insignificant to be armed conflicts:
[Mlany isolated incidents, such as border clashes and naval inci-
dents, are not treated as armed conflicts. It may well be, therefore,
that only when fighting reaches a level of intensity which exceeds
that of such isolated clashes will it be treated as an armed conflict to
which the rules of international humanitarian law apply.
65
Nor is the single attack, regardless of how significant, an
armed conflict. Armed conflict requires exchange.66 It begins not
with the attack, but with the counter-attack.67 A State may have
the right to engage in a war of self-defense following an attack,
but if the State chooses not to exercise that right, there is no
armed conflict.6" Likewise, if an individual is punched, but walks
away from his attacker, we do not say there is a fight. Without a
counter-punch the person is a victim, not a fighter. Parallel con-
cepts apply among states. We understand armed conflict to re-
quire armed exchange by organized groups lasting for some pe-
61. Id.
62. USE OF FORCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 57, at 9-12.
63. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 102-04 (June
27).
64. Partial Award, Jus Ad Bellum (Eth. v. Eri.), Ethiopia's Claims 1-8, at 4-8, (Eri-
trea Ethiopia Claims Comm'n Dec. 19, 2005), 45 I.L.M. 430 (2006).
65. Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE
HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 39, 42 (Dieter Fleck ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1995) (footnotes omitted).
66. Even when an attack is significant, other conditions must be met before the victim
of such an attack may respond in lawful self-defense. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful
Self-Defense to Terrorism, U. PITT. L. REV. 889, 889-90 (2002). A significant armed attack,
something more than a frontier incident, may give rise to the right of self-defense. See id.
at 891-92. In addition to the armed attack, the victim state must be able to achieve the
purpose of self-defense and it must focus its response on a state that is responsible for the
unlawful initial attack. See id. at 893, 899. The mere presence of terrorists, for example,
on the territory of a state is insufficient to trigger the territorial state's right of self-
defense. See id. at 902.
67. Mary Ellen O'Connell, When Is a War Not a War? The Myths of the Global War on
Terror, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 535, 538 (2006).
68. Id.
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riod and involving more than a de minimis amount of force.69 In
other words, there must be "hostilities" for there to be an armed
conflict. Hostilities are the actual engagement in fighting. 70 One-
way attacks and minor armed exchanges are not armed conflicts.
Some argue that we must treat one-sided, intense armed at-
tacks, such as the 9/11 attacks or the attacks by Israel on Syria in
September of 2007, as armed conflicts so that IHL will apply.71
The thinking is that we must hold attackers to IHL requirements
to make them accountable for attacking civilians and civilian ob-
jects. But this is not the right body of rules to govern attacks
outside an armed conflict. IHL does not apply, but, rather, the
law of peace-criminal law. Criminal law not only makes it mur-
der to kill civilians in such situations, but also to kill members of
the military. There is no combatant's privilege to kill outside
armed conflict. 3 Under the "one-sided attack is armed conflict"
view, if A1-Qaeda had sent an unmanned drone to bomb the Pen-
tagon on 9/11, that would have been a lawful attack. The Israeli
bombing of Syria also would have been lawful because Israel used
military jets and attacked a suspected weapons facility.74 Israel's
attack was no more lawful, however, than its 1981 attack on the
Osirik nuclear reactor in Iraq, which was unanimously con-
demned by the U.N. Security Council.75
69. See O'Connell, supra note 66, at 890-91 & n.12; see also Definition of Aggression,
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, U.N. Doc. A/9619 and Corr. 1 (Dec. 14, 1974), reprinted in
69 AM. J. INT'L L. 480 (1975).
70. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Third Expert Meeting on the Notion
of Direct Participation in Direct Hostilities 18-19 (2005), http://icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.
nsf/htmllparticipation-hostilities-ihl-311205 (follow "Summary Report 2005" hyperlink).
Several important protections in IHL are linked to "hostilities" and not armed conflict,
such as the requirement that detainees not charged with a crime be released at the end of
hostilities. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra
note 2, art. 118. A civilian who takes direct part in "hostilities" loses his or her civilian
immunity. See Margaret C. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendi-
tion and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1333, 1410 (2007). It is argued below that
he or she becomes a "combatant."
71. See, e.g., Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. IN'L L. 1
(2003).
72. See id. at 47.
73. Cf. Additional Geneva Protocol I, supra note 40, art. 43(a) (limiting the right to
participate in hostilities to combatants).
74. See Uzi Mahnaimi, Sarah Baxter & Michael Sheridan, Israelis "Blew Apart Syrian
Nuclear Cache," SUNDAY TIMES (London), Sept. 16, 2007, at 24, available at http://www.
timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle-east/article2461421.ece.
75. S.C. Res. 487, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981).
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It is not entirely clear why some scholars press for finding one-
sided attacks to be armed conflicts. One argument is that if such
situations are armed conflicts, IHL applies.76 IHL is well-
regarded and the ICRC has had perhaps more success in imple-
menting and enforcing it than other human rights bodies have in
implementing and enforcing human rights and international
criminal law. But human rights are more restricted in wartime
than in peace: the combatant's privilege to kill does not apply. It
would be murder to send a drone to bomb the Pentagon because
military targets are not lawful targets in peacetime. The only ac-
ceptable legal position is to determine the proper law-IHL or
peacetime human rights law-and do our utmost to ensure its
proper application.
Nevertheless, Administration officials argued that an armed
conflict began on 9/11 because the attacks were "acts of war."77
Some also point to other attacks by A1-Qaeda during the previous
ten years and the U.S. counter-attacks in Sudan and Afghanistan
to argue that this series amounts to a sort of slow-motion armed
conflict.7" The United States did "counter-punch" for the embassy
attacks in East Africa in 1998. Some months after the embassies
were attacked, the United States dropped bombs on a factory in
Sudan and on A1-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.79 These bombings
by the United States were not treated as an armed conflict. Nei-
ther Sudan nor Afghanistan responded militarily, and, given the
long delay between these uses of force and September 11, 2001,
the 1998 bombings are more appropriately classified as "sporadic
acts of violence" or "incidents." They were not part of an armed
conflict.80
Nathaniel Berman, nevertheless, suggests that a worldwide
struggle with A1-Qaeda could meet the definition of armed con-
76. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
77. Remarks Following a Meeting with the National Security Team, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1100 (Sept. 12, 2001).
78. See, e.g., Matthew Scott King, Comment, The Legality of the United States' War on
Terror: Is Article 51 a Legitimate Vehicle for the War in Afghanistan or Just a Blanket To
Cover Up International War Crimes, 9 ILSA J. INTL & COMP. L. 457 (2003).
79. Eugene Robinson & Dana Priest, Reports of U.S. Strikes' Destruction Vary; Afgha-
nistan Damage 'Moderate to Heavy Sudan Plant Leveled, WASH. POST., Aug. 22, 1998, at
Al.
80. See generally Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Legal Case Against the Global War on
Terror, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 349, 353-57 (2004) (discussing the difference between
"armed conflict" and "sporadic acts").
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flict developed in Tadic as long as "protracted" is deemed to in-
clude "a conflict that is both spatially dispersed and temporally
discontinuous, waxing and waning by fits and starts for over ten
years-and provided that such a discontinuous conflict is not dis-
qualified as an armed conflict by describing it as 'sporadic."'' Yet,
this description plainly applies to international criminal activity,
not armed conflict as defined in the ILA's Use of Force Commit-
tee's Report. 2 Long-running sporadic acts of violence, such as
those carried out by the Irish Republican Army or the Palestine
Liberation Organization, have not been treated by states as
armed conflict but instead have been treated for the scourge they
are-terrorism. Outside armed conflicts involving the United
States in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, A1-Qaeda's actions and
U.S. responses have been too sporadic and low-intensity to quali-
fy as armed conflict.
In addition to exchange, intensity, and duration, armed con-
flicts have a spatial dimension. It is not the case that if there is
an armed conflict in one state-for example, Afghanistan-that
all the world is at war, or even that Afghanis and Americans are
at war with each other all over the planet. Armed conflicts inevit-
ably have a limited and identifiable territorial or spatial dimen-
sion because human beings who participate in armed conflict re-
quire territory in which to carry out intense, protracted, armed
exchanges.8 4 International armed conflicts involving sovereign
states inevitably implicate the territory controlled by those
states. Additional Protocol II, Article 1 includes a requirement of
territorial control for the Protocol to apply to non-international
armed conflict:
This Protocol... shall apply to all armed conflicts... which take
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part
81. Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal
Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 32-33 (2004).
82. See ILA USE OF FORCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 57.
83. See, e.g., David Turns, The "War on Terror" Through British and International
Humanitarian Law Eyes: Comparative Perspectives on Selected Legal Issues, 10 N.Y. CITY
L. REV. 435, 445-46 (2007).
84. Although it has not been done and seems unlikely, groups could carry out an
armed conflict on the high seas.
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of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and con-
certed military operations and to implement this Protocol.85
As Article 1 indicates, for fighting to reach the requisite level of
intensity between groups that are sufficiently well organized con-
trol of territory is generally a necessity.8 6 Sufficient weapons for
intense fighting, space to train with weapons, a command struc-
ture, and training to act in a coordinated fashion under command
are concomitants of armed conflict-and all require some terri-
torial control.8 7
Terrorists need not have such control. By building bombs or
plotting airplane hijackings, small terrorist cells can operate
without detection on territory controlled by others. Preventing
such terrorist acts and dismantling terrorist organizations re-
quire careful police work. The success of the British against the
Irish Republican Army and, more recently, against the July 2007
terrorists,8 the Spanish success against A1-Qaeda after the
March 2004 bombing, 9 as well as the U.S. success after the 1993
World Trade Center bombing ° all support the importance of the
law enforcement approach. Sending major military forces has
proven not only less successful, but counter-productive, as the use
of force against A1-Qaeda in Afghanistan, beginning October 7,
2001, and in Somalia, beginning in January of 2007, demon-
strate .91
During the Second World War, there was intense fighting in
large parts of the world. Nothing of the kind has been seen since.
The Cold War had global dimensions but was only a war in the
rhetorical sense. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld tried in the
summer of 2005, and again in early 2006, to move away from the
85. Additional Geneva Protocol II, supra note 40, art. 1.
86. See Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Chal-
lenges from the "War on Terror," 27:2 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 62 (2003).
87. See Mariano-Florentino Cubllar, The Untold Story of al Qaeda's Administrative
Law Dilemmas, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1302, 1329 (2007).
88. See Editorial, The British Way with Terrorists, BOSTON GLOBE, July 3, 2007, at
A10.
89. See Sebastian Rotella, Spain Hunts Fugitive Tied to Al Qaeda, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
14, 2004, at A3.
90. See Patricia Cohen, Convicted: 4 Guilty in the Plot To Bomb the World Trade Cen-
ter, NEWSDAY, Mar. 5, 1994, at 3.
91. For a discussion of why treating terrorism as armed conflict-not crime-may
prove counter-productive in the suppression of terrorism, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, En-
hancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a Global War on Terror?, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANS. NAT'L L. 435 (2005).
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label "global war on terrorism" to "global struggle against violent
extremism" (G-SAVE) or "the Long War"-a label meant to be
reminiscent of the Cold War.92 Apparently it became clear to
Rumsfeld that calling the campaign against terrorism a war
when it lacked the basic indicia of a war or armed conflict had se-
rious disadvantages; in particular, it would be difficult to provide
indications of when the "war" would be won. President Bush,
however, clarified that he considered the war on terror a real
war-one in which persons could be killed without warning all
over the globe and detained indefinitely.93
Rumsfeld's attempt to back away from the assertion that the
United States became involved in an actual world-wide armed
conflict on 9/11 reminds us why the declaration of a "global war"
was such a departure from state practice. States are generally re-
luctant to acknowledge armed conflict is occurring on their terri-
tory. Armed conflict means a government has failed to maintain
control. By contrast, all societies suffer criminality-that is not
the same kind of failure. As such, governments typically try to
claim any violence on their territories is crime, not armed conflict.
The claim that violence is criminality and not armed conflict is
plausible, however, only to the extent the armed group does not
control territory.
The preference for limiting the understanding of what consti-
tutes armed conflict is also seen in the concept of the conflict
zone. Armed conflict inevitably occurs in limited spaces-a thea-
ter of operations, zone of combat, or conflict zone. The United Na-
tions Charter limits the right to use force to self-defense or to sit-
uations where the Security Council has provided authorization. 94
Lawful force in either case must be limited to what is necessary
and proportional to achieve the lawful purpose.95 States acting
lawfully cannot escalate a conflict by using more force than is ne-
cessary and proportional to achieve the intended purpose.96 "Ne-
92. See, e.g., Paul Richter, Rumsfeld Hasn't Hit a Dead End in Forging Terms for Foe
in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005, at All.
93. See supra notes 3, 76 and accompanying text.
94. U.N. Charter art. 51.
95. Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 391, 391 (1993).
96. See Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence and the Conduct of International Armed
Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI
ROSENNE 273, 279 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1989).
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cessity" refers to military necessity and the obligation that force
should be used only if necessary to accomplish a reasonable mili-
tary objective." "Proportionality" prohibits that "which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would
be excessive in relation to concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.""8 This restriction on permissible force extends to
both the quantity and geographic scope of the force used.9 A state
acts in lawful self-defense when it responds to an armed attack
using only necessary and proportional force.100 According to
Christopher Greenwood,
Military operations will not normally be conducted throughout the
area of war. The area in which operations are actually taking place
at any given time is known as the "area of operations" or "theatre of
war." The extent to which a belligerent today is justified in expand-
ing the area of operations will depend upon whether it is necessary
for him to do so in order to exercise his right of self-defence. While a
state cannot be expected always to defend itself solely on ground of
the aggressor's choosing, any expansion of the area of operations
may not go beyond what constitutes a necessary and proportionate
measure of self-defence. In particular, it cannot be assumed-as in
the past-that a state engaged in armed conflict is free to attack its
adversary anywhere in the area of war.
101
Greenwood further points out,
Portugal did not react to India's seizure of Goa in 1961 by seizing In-
dian shipping in European waters where Portugal enjoyed naval su-
periority. Similarly, had a British warship encountered an Argentine
warship in an area of the Pacific, far removed from the Falkland Is-
97. See W. Michael Reisman & Douglas L. Stevick, The Applicability of International
Law Standards to United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 86,
94-95 (1998).
98. Additional Geneva Protocol I, supra note 40, art. 51(5). According to Gardam:
The legitimate resort to force under the United Nations system is regarded
by most commentators as restricted to the use of force in self-defense under
Article 51 and collective security action under chapter VII of the UN Charter.
The resort to force in both these situations is limited by the customary law
requirement that it be proportionate to the unlawful aggression that gave
rise to the right. In the law of armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is
based on the fundamental principle that belligerents do not enjoy an unli-
mited choice of means to inflict damage on the enemy.
Gardam, supra note 95, at 391.
99. See Additional Geneva Protocol I, supra note 40, art. 51(5).
100. See Greenwood, supra note 65, at 53.
101. Id.; see also JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY STATES 162-63 (2004); Greenwood, supra note 96, at 276-78. But see YORAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 19-20 (4th ed., 2005).
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lands, at the time of the Argentine invasion, it would not have been
a lawful measure of self-defence for one ship to engage the other un-
less there was clear evidence that the other ship was about to launch
an attack.
1 0 2
We can add to these examples the extent of force used to liberate
Kuwait from Iraq's unlawful invasion in 1990-1991. The coalition
that liberated Kuwait used the force necessary to liberate and
provide for future defense. It did not go to Baghdad and change
the regime of Saddam Hussein-action not necessary to the libe-
ration. 103
Yoram Dinstein, however, continues to hold the view that when
two states engage in armed conflict, the conflict extends to all of
the states' territory, regardless of the actual incidence of intense
fighting. 10 4 Indeed, he argues that it extends to ships and planes
far from the state's territory or actual combat zone: "The combat
zone on land is likely to be quite limited in geographic scope, yet
naval and air units may attack targets in distant areas."0 5 This
statement does not, however, take into account the requirements
of necessity and proportionality, or the actual practice of states,
which support the Greenwood view.
State practice shows that government officials do not recognize
the rights and duties of the battlefield as extending far beyond it.
In the United States, after 9/11, the U.S. government behaved
consistently with the reality that armed conflicts were being
waged in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, but not within the
United States. If a uniformed member of the U.S. armed forces
had been killed by a uniformed member of the Iraqi Republican
Guard on the streets of any U.S. city, such killing would have
been considered murder. If an Iraqi civilian carried out such a
killing, it would also have been murder, and the accused would
have been placed in the civilian criminal justice system. To be-
come a combatant, a civilian must take direct part in hostilities,
and no hostilities have occurred in the United States on 9/11 or in
the seven years following.
102. Greenwood, supra note 95, at 277; see also, John Alan Cohan, Legal War: When
Does It Exist, and When Does It End?, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 276 (2004)
("Wars often have a geographic limitation, so that we might employ such terms as 'thea-
tres of war,' or 'regions of warfare.'").
103. See GARDAM, supra note 101, at 165-66. But see DINSTEIN, supra note 101, at 211.
104. DINSTEIN, supra note 101, at 20.
105. Id. at 19-20.
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Combatants, lawful and unlawful, could be found in Afghanis-
tan, Iraq and Somalia, but not in places where there are no hos-
tilities such as Hamburg, Germany, O'Hare Airport in Chicago,
Peoria, Illinois, or Switzerland. The idea of the theater of war or
combat zone is closely tied to our thinking regarding who is a
combatant.
In the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court had
to determine whether a U.S. citizen who denied he was an enemy
combatant was entitled to any neutral process in which to make
his case.1 °6 Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality, regretted
that the Administration had supplied no clear understanding of
what it meant by "enemy combatant."'17 She supplied this defini-
tion for purposes of the case: "'One who takes up arms against the
United States in a foreign theater of war... may properly be des-
ignated an enemy combatant.""' 8
Because it is not appropriate to apply IHL in peace, and be-
cause peace is what we strive for, governments should apply
normal criminal law as much as possible. Certainly when there is
doubt as to whether a situation is one of armed conflict or peace,
governments should err on the side of peace.
Conclusion
In an armed conflict, in the zone of hostilities, combatants may
be targeted without warning or detained without trial. Such
treatment is unlawful against persons engaging in violence in the
absence of armed conflict.0 9 Armed conflict occurs when orga-
nized armed groups exchange protracted, intense, armed hostili-
ties. The groups must be associated with territory. In addition to
the concept of armed conflict, the concept of conflict zone is im-
portant. Killing combatants or detaining them without trial until
the end of hostilities is consistent with the principles of necessity
and proportionality, as well as general human rights, when re-
lated to a zone of actual armed hostilities. Outside such a zone,
106. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality opinion).
107. Id. at 516.
108. Id. (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 475 (4th Cir. 2003)).
109. See Jelena Pejic, Terrorist Acts and Groups: A Role for International Law?, 75
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 71, 97 (2005); Gabor Rona, Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An
Abundant Inventory of Existing Tools, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 499, 502 (2005) (footnotes omit-
ted).
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however, authorities must attempt to arrest a suspect and only
target to kill those who pose an immediate lethal threat and
refuse to surrender. Those arrested outside a conflict zone should
receive a speedy trial on the basis of the evidence that has led to
the arrest. There must be an evidentiary basis to charge a person
with a crime-much more evidence than supports the right to de-
tain an enemy combatant captured on an actual battlefield in a
zone of combat.
